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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the underlying factors driving piracy off the coast of Somalia and 
examines the effectiveness of the international naval anti-piracy mission with respect 
to its declared aims. We show that while the navies perform well with respect to their 
short-term aims, they failed to contain the escalation of the piracy problem through 
2009: pirates have been diverted from the Gulf of Aden into the Indian Ocean and the 
Arabian Sea. Evidence from domestic conditions in Somalia suggests that economic 
development and greater stability might in fact aid pirates. 
 
 
1: Introduction 
 
Piracy off the Horn of Africa has grown substantially in recent years. Data from the 
International Maritime Bureau reveals that there were 22 pirate attacks in 2000, rising 
to 108 in 2008 and 143 in the first half of 2009.1 The types of incident involving 
pirates in the region have ranged from small-scale captures as in the recent capture of 
a British couple sailing round the world in their yacht (October 2009),2 to large 
attacks with potential implications for international security, as when the Ukrainian 
tanker MV Faina was captured along with its cargo of battle tanks, artillery shells and 
grenade launchers.3 The estimated additional costs of specialty marine risk insurance 
for ships using the Gulf of Aden trade route in 2009 were estimated to be US$ 
400mn.4 
 
In November 2008 the European Union mounted its first ever joint naval operation in 
response to increasing pirate activity off the coast of Somalia. In addition NATO’s 
Operation Allied Protector and Operation Allied Provider and Combined Task Force 
150, a joint task force led by the United States, are operating in the area. The aims of 
the naval intervention are to ensure that vessels of the World Food Programme (WFP) 
can deliver food aid to displaced people in Somalia, to protect shipping in the Gulf of 
Aden and deter pirates from operating in the region.  
 
                                                 
1 See Diagram 1. The figures include incidents carried out by Somali pirates in the Arabian sea 
2 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/kent/8330406.stm 
3 http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/12/18/somalia.pirate/index.html#cnnSTCText 
4 http://www.begbies-traynorgroup.com/investigations/news/08-12-
15/surge_in_marine_piracy_likely_to_hit_costs.aspx 
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In this paper we aim to address three questions: Firstly, how has piracy in Somalia 
evolved in recent years and what have been its determinants? We observe a number of 
developments in Somali piracy. The number of attacks carried out has risen and the 
targets and methods used have changed. Initially men in skiffs armed with machetes 
attacked fishing vessels claiming to be “Somali coastguards” letting their victims go 
after extracting a “fine”. Pirates then moved on to hijacking cargo ships and yachts for 
ransom. Today’s pirates are armed with automatic weapons and operate from so 
called “mother-ships”, greatly increasing the potential range of operations. We show 
that piracy grows in response to past successful hijacks, probably because ransoms are 
used to acquire new equipment and because young men are drawn to the extremely 
lucrative opportunities in piracy. 
 
Secondly, we examine to what extent the naval counter-piracy initiatives of the EU 
and NATO can be considered successful. We argue that while the navies correctly 
highlight their achievements in terms of deterring attacks on specific ships and in 
guarding food deliveries these are essentially short term successes.5 We analyse 
monthly attack data from 2000-2009 and daily attack data in 2008 and 2009. These 
show that deterrence events do not appear to have a negative effect on pirate activities 
in the long term. We show that, at best, the arrival of naval forces on the scene of an 
attempted hijack postpones further pirate activities by a matter of days. In addition 
pirates have extended their sphere of operation from the Gulf of Aden where shipping 
traffic and naval forces are concentrated into areas that are not easily monitored, such 
as the open waters off the coast of Somalia, the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean off 
the coast of Kenya, Tanzania and the Seychelles. This mirrors classic results from 
research on counter-terrorism where the securing of specific facilities diverts terrorists 
to soft targets.6  
 
Thirdly, we attempt to answer the question to what extent Somali piracy is linked to 
the absence of authoritative government and lack of economic opportunity in Somalia. 
If piracy is linked to internal chaos in Somalia it is likely that the exclusively sea-
based naval operations will have limited success as long as Somalia remains a failed 
state. Our results suggest that pirates benefit from local improvements in governance, 
which can occur even without the presence of an effective central government.7 A 
substantial gain in centralized stability might well reduce the incidence of piracy, but 
it is likely that short-term gains in local stability could increase pirate attacks. This 
result could thus have implications for how state reconstruction in Somalia ought to 
proceed. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides some background material on 
Somalia, an overview of how Somali piracy developed over time and how the multi-
lateral naval missions have attempted to resolve the piracy problem. Section 3 
discusses the data and methodology of the statistical analyses, section 4 provides and 
analyses the results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2: Somalia, Somali Piracy and the Multilateral Naval Missions 
                                                 
5 http://www.eunavfor.eu/category/press/feed/ 
6 Enders and Sandler (2004) 
7 Menkhaus (2007) 
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2:1 Somalia: a failed state 
 
The United Republic of Somalia was formed from the former British protectorate of 
Somaliland and Italian Somalia and became independent in 1960. The first years of its 
independence were marred by border disputes with Ethiopia and Kenya and politics 
were characterised by fighting among various clans for political supremacy.  
 
From 1969 to 1991 Somalia was governed by Mohammed Said Barre, who replaced 
the assassinated elected president Abdi Rashid Ali Shermake after a coup. His corrupt 
administration was based on cold-war fuelled foreign aid and “divide-and- rule” 
tactics, which generated deep animosities between clans.8 Around 75% of Somalis 
belong to the six major clan families: the Darod, Digil, Dir, Hawiye, Isaaq and 
Rahanwein. Of these the Darod clan has tended to be the most influential.9 When 
Western aid was drastically reduced after 1989, state failure was almost inevitable and 
clan battles erupted in 1991. Including the victims of the famine of 1991/92 (caused 
by widespread looting and banditry) an estimated quarter of a million Somalis died 
and a million fled to other countries during the civil war. 10  
 
The US and UN failed in their missions to restore order and safeguard relief supplies 
and ended their engagement in 1994 and 1995 respectively. In the resulting security 
vacuum Somali clan families strengthened their hold on political and economic life. 
Local polities emerged with Islamic courts backed by clan elders, business people and 
Muslim clergy re-establishing the rule of law in many communities. 11 At the central 
government level, however, it has proved impossible to find a way to find a way past 
the clan divisions and find a formula for power sharing.  
 
Each attempt at building a government of national unity has ended in a narrow 
coalition taking power. In August 2000 clan leaders meeting in Djibouti appointed a 
transitional national parliament. Its elected president entered Mogadishu in October 
2000 and announced the first government since 1991. However, the parliament was 
dominated by Mogadishu-based clans and elsewhere the government was not 
accepted as a government of national unity. The administration was fiercely opposed 
by those clans who had not done well in the distribution of posts as well as factions 
that were opposed to central government altogether.12  
 
In October 2004 after two years of fresh peace talks a new transitional federal 
government (TFG) was inaugurated in Kenya and managed to meet in Somalia for the 
first time in February 2006. This time the TFG excluded the Mogadishu-based clans 
which had dominated the previous government and the Islamist groups from positions 
of power, reflecting at least partially the preferences of Ethiopian mediators. Islamist 
groups immediately began to contest the peace deal. From March to May 2006 
fighting erupted between militias loyal to the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and the 
TFG.  
 
                                                 
8 Menkhaus (2007a) 
9 Soerensen (2008) 
10 Menkhaus (2007a)  
11 Menkhaus (2007a) 
12 Menkhaus (2007b) 
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In June 2006 the militias of the UIC took control of Mogadishu and parts of Southern 
Somalia. In December 2006 they were driven out of Mogadishu by Ethiopian troops 
and troops of the transitional government. However, fighting between insurgents and 
Ethiopian and government troops continues into 2009, with Mogadishu seeing the 
greatest disruption. All attempts at establishing a government in the capital continue 
to be disrupted by fierce gun battles, suicide bombings and political assassinations. 
More than 1.5 million people are estimated by the World Food programme to be 
internally displaced within Somalia and 2.87 million received food aid in 2009.13 
 
 
2:2 Somali Pirates 
Pirates in Somalia operate in this context of general lawlessness. A low level of 
opportunistic and small scale pirate activity has taken place in the Gulf of Aden and 
the Red Sea for many years. Geographical opportunity is an important factor in 
piracy: attacks are more likely to be successful where geographical features dictate 
that international shipping traffic moves close to the shore and is highly concentrated. 
Slow boats are easier to board.14 Initially the attacks were based on acts of theft or 
extortion and often targeted fishing vessels, which were (illegally) fishing off the 
Somali coast. Pirates used small boats (skiffs) and basic weaponry and were therefore 
restricted in their operations. They can be repelled by crews taking the initiative 
spraying water from fire-hoses and throwing items overboard.15 
 
The collapse of political and civil order in Somalia and the absence of central law 
enforcement in the coastal regions meant that pirates could vastly increase the 
profitability of their activities by hijacking and holding ships for ransom. Attacks 
increased in frequency and audacity. Ships can be held mostly unchallenged by the 
authorities in the ports of Eyl, Hobyo and Gharardeere until ransom negotiations are 
concluded.16 Increasing returns from piracy appear to have funded technological 
improvements, such as small arms, automatic weapons and rocket propelled grenades. 
This has raised the stakes for crews who want to resist pirates.  
 
The other main innovation has been the use of motherships from which the small 
skiffs (which are still being used for attacks) are launched. The use of motherships 
extends the radius of operations well beyond the coastal waters off Somalia. Pirates 
can move unnoticed in the shipping lanes until ready to launch an attack and are no 
longer confined to harbour during the monsoon season. Motherships are mostly 
fishing vessels and diving-boats, which are hijacked and used for a period until their 
stores run out, the crew is ransomed or the vessel’s use as a mothership is suspected.17  
 
Below we model the drivers of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of 
Somalia. We build the model on the hypotheses outlined by Murphy (2007), who 
stresses that piracy is first and foremost an issue of opportunity and promise of reward 
                                                 
13 http://www.wfp.org/countries/somalia 
14 Murphy (2007) 
15 For example the IMB piracy reports provide the following examples: on 13 February 2002, an attack 
on the bulk carrier Altair was aborted after the “duty officer … increased speed, zigzagged the ship’s 
course and activated fire hoses.” On 24 April 2009 pirates left when the crew of the cargo ship 
Boularibank “activated water hydrant and released timber baulks into the sea.  
16 BBC (18/09/2008) Life in Somalia’s Pirate Town http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7623329.stm  
17 See for example http://www.eunavfor.eu/2009/11/eu-navfor-assists-indian-dhow-released-by-pirates/  
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and only secondarily an issue of poverty. We look at opportunity, costs, risks, 
resources and poverty as the potential determinants of piracy. We add variables on the 
activities of the international naval forces to examine whether they have been able to 
significantly change the incentives for pirates by increasing the risks associated with 
carrying out acts of piracy.   
 
 
2:3 The Multilateral Naval Mission 
 
As the Gulf of Aden presents a perfect geographical opportunity for piracy there is a 
history of attacks on ships in this area. However, the problem has escalated in recent 
years and naval security patrols have been formally operating in the Gulf of Aden and 
off the coast of Somalia since August 2008 (diagram 1).  
 
Even before formal security patrols started naval vessels provided occasional 
assistance to attacked ships and the navy mounted a small number of rescue 
operations of hijacked vessels.18 In response to these rescue operations pirates adapted 
their strategies, threatening to kill hostages if attacked and holding at least part of the 
crew on land during ransom negotiations to discourage rescue attempts of boats in 
Somali harbours. The navies’ focus has therefore shifted to prevention and deterrence, 
with ever more international naval vessels present in the Gulf of Aden coming from 
EU and NATO countries as well as Japan, Russia and China.19  
 
In December 2008 the EU formalised its engagement in the region with operation EU 
NAVFOR  Atalanta. The three declared aims of the EU NAVFOR  are 1) “the 
protection of vessels of the World Food Programme (WFP) delivering food aid to 
displaced persons in Somalia”, 2) the “protection of vulnerable vessels” transiting 
through the area and 3) to “bring an end to acts of piracy and armed robbery” in the 
region.20 In what follows we analyse the success of the naval mission with respect to 
the three aims above. 
 
Somalia is one of the poorest countries in the world. It has probably the world’s 
highest need for food relief relative to the size of its population: out of a total 
population of around 10 million Somalis the World Food Programme aims to support 
3.64 million people suffering malnutrition because of conflict, displacement and 
drought. 90% of the food aid is transported by sea. 21 After attacks on a number of 
WFP deliveries all captains of large cargo ships bringing in food supplies have 
requested protection.22 A naval escort system was implemented in November 2007 
and there have been no attacks on WFP transports under escort. The WFP was 
therefore able to scale up its operations from delivering 10,000MT of food supplies in 
                                                 
18 For example: January 2002, September 2003, march 2005 and January 2006. IMB piracy reports 
19 See Appendix 1 
20 “bring an end to acts of piracy and armed robbery” used in the original wording of the Atalanta 
mission – see for example: http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/133184.php  and 
http://www.german-info.com/press_shownews.php?pid=1010. However,  this seems to have been 
amended recently to “deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the 
Somali coast”  http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1518&lang=en 
21 http://www.wfp.org/countries/somalia 
22 For example see http://www.eunavfor.eu/2009/11/eunavfor-warship-louise-marie-protects-wfp/ and  
http://www.eunavfor.eu/2009/11/eu-navfor-escorts-amisom-vessel/  
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2007 to 35,000MT in 2008 and an estimated 50,000MT in 2009.23 There is therefore 
no doubt about the success of the naval mission in this respect.24  
 
To achieve the second aim of protecting vulnerable shipping the naval forces provide 
a number of services. The first is advice to ship-owners about security measures to 
minimise the risk of attacks such as speed and route of travel, evasive actions and 
securing decks, based on detailed analysis of past attacks.25 Secondly, ships are 
advised to travel through the Gulf of Aden in a specific transit corridor patrolled by 
naval vessels. There are also group transits with naval escorts based on ship speed.26 
Finally, ships that come under attack can request assistance from naval vessels; 
though there is no guarantee that assistance will be rendered in time to prevent pirates 
from boarding. Once pirates have successfully boarded a ship, the naval forces do not 
intervene to avoid risking the lives of the crew or endangering the cargo.27 Navies 
monitor the progress of hijacked vessel and sometimes render assistance after a vessel 
is ransomed.28  
 
The success of the above measures in protecting vulnerable shipping is debatable. On 
the one hand the IMB reports 50 attacks abandoned at the arrival of naval ships and 
helicopters from January 2008 to June 2009. On the other hand deterrence was not 
perfect because there were 251 attacks during this period (143 of these in 2009). 72 of 
the 251 attempts resulted in a successful hijacking.  
 
The naval mission’s third aim referred to the long-term goal of deterring Somali 
pirates from operating. The measures taken here are the presence of naval vessels to 
aid attacked ships, confiscation of pirates’ equipment and boats and the detention and 
trial of pirates caught in the act of piracy. Due to the operation of forces from 
different nationalities it is difficult to collate data on the number and timing of events 
when pirates intercepted, detained and tried. In any case, the effect of detentions and 
trials on subsequent acts of piracy is debatable. On the one hand arrested pirates are 
prevented from committing acts of piracy, but on the other hand detention followed 
by political asylum in a Western country could be an attraction in itself.29 Given the 
lack of economic opportunity in Somalia and the potential rewards of pirate activity 
(or arrest!), there is unlikely to be a shortage of recruits to replace any arrested 
pirates.30 In any case as the burden of proof required for a conviction is high, most 
pirates are released either immediately or after trial.31  
                                                 
23 http://www.wfp.org/stories/wfp-logistics-somalia-2009 
24 However, there is a question of whether using frigates to escort slow cargo ships to Mogadishu at an 
estimated cost of US$300,000 a day is the most cost effective solution or whether private security firms 
could provide protection more cheaply. 
25 http://www.mschoa.eu/ 
26 http://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=70&Itemid=58 
27 Ransoms have so far been very much lower than the combined value of cargo and ships. See BBC 
(18/09/2008) Life in Somalia’s Pirate Town http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7623329.stm and Soerensen 
(2007) 
28 Released ships are vulnerable to being attacked again as they are low on stores and fuel, run by an 
often traumatised crew and slowed down by soiling from long periods in harbour.  
29 Based on interviews with naval officers and risk consultants. Some governments have made 
arrangements that pirates will be prosecuted in Kenya to lower the attractiveness of being arrested. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/24/world/africa/24kenya.html 
30 Somali Pirates living the high life http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7650415.stm 
31 See Times Online November 29, 2009 Navy releases Somali pirates caught red-handed 
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The destruction of equipment is likely to have a less ambiguous effect on subsequent 
pirate activities. Arms, boats and GPS / telephone equipment are likely to represent a 
significant capital outlay for pirate groups. The case is less clear for motherships, 
however, which are thought to be hijacked and used for limited periods only. We will 
therefore try answering the question to what extent the naval mission was successful 
by statistical analysis: can we find evidence that there were fewer attacks because of 
naval deterrence events or the institution of the transit corridor?32 
 
 
3: Model, Data and Methodology 
 
We model piracy off the coast of Somalia from January 2000 to June 2009. The 
model is loosely based on the “reasons for piracy” outlined by Murphy (2007).33 A 
number of the factors are, however, time invariant in Somalia and we therefore focus 
on those variables where we see variation over time. Our initial hypotheses are the 
following: 
 
1. Piracy is a function of opportunity: the more shipping traffic there is and the 
easier it is to attack them the higher the number of pirate attacks. 
2. Piracy is a function of risk: piracy will be lower during monsoon seasons and 
when there is greater law enforcement through international naval forces. 
3. Piracy is a function of resources: The more equipment can be funded, the 
higher the incidence of piracy. 
4. Piracy is a function of poverty: If conditions in the Somali economy 
significantly worsen or households are in need of additional resources to make 
specific expenditures, more men may be attracted to piracy. 
5. Piracy is a function of costs: piracy is an economic activity – if costs rise 
(ceteris paribus) then we would expect piracy to decrease.  
 
We test a number of models, taking a general to specific approach to modelling, i.e. 
we use a wide set of variables initially and then test down to a specific model by 
eliminating insignificant variables. In the results section we report the preferred 
specifications as well as commenting on the variables which were eliminated. We use 
a number of different geographical and temporal aggregations to shed light on the 
connections between piracy and its potential determinants.  
 
The first series of tests looks at the Monthly number of incidents.  We use both 
basic OLS regression and a time series Tobit to take into account that just under a 
third of total observations are zero observations– i.e. no attack took place. There is a 
clear time trend in the data with overall piracy around Somalia and Aden increasing 
over time and the series also becomes more volatile (diagram 1). We include a lagged 
dependent variable in the model and use robust standard errors to correct for this 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/africa/article6936318.ece. The Combined Maritime 
Forces reported on 23 October 2009 that 611 pirates were encountered between 22 August 2008 and 23 
October 2009.  Of these 358 were immediately released. 242 were turned over for prosecution. Out of 
59 trials, 24 resulted in the release of the pirates. Only 11 pirates were killed.  
32 We are lacking data about the timing and scale of arrests, but are working on this. 
33 Legal and jurisdictional weakness, favourable geography, conflict and disorder, under-funded law 
enforcement, permissive cultural environment and promise of rewards. 
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pattern. We check that the residuals do not exhibit a time trend and are normally 
distributed. As an additional robustness check we also model the Change in attacks 
from one month to the next. This difference variable makes the series stationary, but 
the variance of the series increases towards the end. We correct for this 
heteroskedasticity problem by using robust standard errors.  
 
We model three series in the monthly analysis: firstly we model Somali piracy as one 
phenomenon. Secondly, we split the series into attacks in the Gulf of Aden and 
attacks made in the Indian Ocean off the Somali coast, the Arabian Sea and as far 
South as the Seychelles. The reason for this approach is that while all attacks are 
presumed to be carried out by Somali pirates we want to check whether the effect of 
additional security measures in the Gulf of Aden has been to suppress piracy or 
simply divert pirates to less easily patrolled areas.  
 
The second set of tests is based on Daily Observations of attacks 2008 / 2009: We 
analyse daily data for the period of the naval intervention. We analyse the factors 
which determine whether or not pirates chose to attack on a given day using logit 
analysis. Given that there are a few (22 /545) occasions when there is more than one 
attack in a day we also use an ordered logit to analyse the three possible outcomes. 
Again we analyse the total sample and the Gulf of Aden and the rest of Somali piracy 
separately. The following section describes the data. 
 
Dependent variables: 
The analysis is based on the database published annually by the International 
Maritime Bureau (from 1997 to 2008 and quarterly reports for Q1 and Q2 in 
2009).The IMB provides narratives on all incidents of piracy reported (voluntarily) by 
captains and ship-owners. From the narratives we can distinguish between successful 
raids, successful boarding with subsequent rescue and unsuccessful attempts. The 
latter includes incidents of various degrees of severity ranging from suspicious 
(unidentifiable) vessels spotted by radar several nautical miles away34 to actual 
attempts where shots were fired and boarding was attempted.  
 
It is likely that the dependent variable is measured inaccurately. (Attempted) Piracy is 
often not reported, because it is thought to reflect badly on the shipping companies.35 
Additionally, reported incidents of successful boarding may lead to lengthy forensic 
investigation during which the ship will be confined to harbour.36 However, once the 
naval forces arrived in the Gulf of Aden in recognition of the piracy problem, the 
“stigma effect” of reporting piracy was reduced. Indeed the presence of the Navy 
makes skippers more likely to report suspicious vessels either to request help or to 
help with the counter-piracy effort. The massive increase in reported attempts in 2008 
/ 2009 is therefore likely to be a combination of a rise in pirate activity and an 
increase in reporting. For this reason we experimented both with the raw data series 
and taking natural logs of (1+ events) to compress the distribution and give less 
weight to the large observations. Below we report the results for the series with the 
logarithmic transformation, which shows a significantly better fit than the raw data 
series. 
                                                 
34 E.g. 13.06.2009 “Two skiffs were detected on radar by the tanker underway. Tanker made evasive 
maneuvers, increased speed warned other ships…” 
35 Murphy (2007) 
36 Interviews with ship owners 
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Monthly analysis 
1) Monthly number of incidents in region (Red Sea, Aden and Somalia) 
2) Monthly number of incidents in Aden 
3) Monthly number of incidents in Somalia 
4) Change in the number of attacks from one month to the next 
 
There is a clear time trend in the data with overall piracy around Somalia and Aden 
increasing over time (diagram 1). There is no obvious impact from the naval counter-
piracy mission on the total number of incidents. However, during 2009 incidents off 
the coast of Somalia clearly increase, while the pattern in Aden remains comparable 
to the previous year.  
 
Short run model 
5) Dummy of whether or not an attack occurred on a given day 
6) Ordered variable whether none, one or more than one attack occurred on a 
given day 
 
Independent variables 
Opportunity: 
1) Suez shipping: We have collected data from 2000-2009 on the number of 
ships, the cargo tons and the revenues collected through Suez as a proxy for 
the volume and value of shipping passing through the Gulf of Aden.37  
2) Transit corridor: From February 2009 the naval forces advised shipping to 
use a specific corridor through the Gulf of Aden, which is patrolled by naval 
vessels. In addition ships were given the option of joining escorted convoys 
through the corridor. 
3) Fullmoon and Clearfullmoon: This set of variables is based on the 5 days 
around each full moon during which navigation is easiest.38 For the second 
variable we interacted a dummy of whether or not there was rainfall on the 
Somali coast (Afgoi) with the fullmoon variable to remove full moons during 
which there was likely cloud cover and hence no additional advantage for 
pirates.  
 
Risk 
The main risks to pirates in addition to those of being killed or wounded by a resisting 
crew (which we assume to be constant) are those of navigating in small vessels in 
potentially rough seas and the risk of encountering a naval patrol. Because of 
endogeneity issues we cannot use the presence of naval forces in the region as an 
explanatory variable: the navies are present because of the piracy problem, not the 
other way round. We use the following variables:  
1) North-East monsoon: We enter a dummy variable for the windy period in 
Aden from January-March. Low visibility due to sandstorms over the desert 
and coastal areas and high swells make it dangerous to navigate in skiffs. 
2) Southwest Monsoon: There is a second monsoon period in Aden from June-
August. Again, low visibility due to sandstorms over the desert and coastal 
areas and high swells make it dangerous to navigate in skiffs 
                                                 
37 it is likely to be less good as a proxy for shipping along the coast of Southern Somalia 
38Trade Winds: Pirate Moon Party30 September 2009 
http://www.tradewinds.no/andalso/article545237.ece  
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3) Deterrence: we class a deterrence event as one in which a hijack attempt was 
reported to have been interrupted by a naval ship or helicopter arriving on the 
scene. We have not included incidents in which it is clear that the naval forces 
appeared well after the attempt had been abandoned. In the monthly series we 
use a count of the number of deterrence events in the month. 
4) Rescue: A rescue is any incident in which the pirates boarded a ship but the 
ship was then taken over by security forces and the hostages were released 
without ransom. Sometimes pirates were taken prisoner in the process. 
 
Resources and technology 
4) Lagged dependent variable: This is a proxy for the level of resources 
accumulated in previous periods.  
5) Success: we class as a success any reported incident where the pirates either 
stole property from the ship or (more often) extracted a ransom from the 
owners. We use several lags of this variable, as ransom negotiations take some 
time to conclude. 
6) Motherships We use a dummy taking the value one from the point when 
“motherships” are first mentioned in an annual IMB report (2005 – the dummy 
takes the value 1 from January 2005). Motherships allow pirates to launch 
piracy attacks further from the coast and perhaps make them less dependent on 
weather conditions.  
 
 
Poverty 
Few specific details are known about the Somali economy. The IMF’s 2009 
assessment of Somalia simply states that the Somali government “has not been able to 
restore order” and that the “absence of an internationally recognised government and 
official information about economic and financial developments precludes a full 
assessment…”.39 The CIA Factbook estimates that 65% of GDP comes from 
agriculture and fishing. The principal agricultural products are bananas, sorghum, 
corn, coconuts, rice, sugarcane, mangoes, sesame seeds, beans; cattle, sheep, goats.40  
We therefore use rainfall as a proxy for economic activity, given that much of the 
economy is based on agriculture, which is mostly rainwater-fed or based on irrigation 
from the Juma and Shabelle Rivers.41  
7) Rainfall: We have records of monthly and daily rainfall for three weather 
stations in central Somalia for the period 1997-2009 (with two minor 
interruptions for one of these weather stations).42 We constructed: average 
rainfall per month, difference from long run monthly average (1997-2008), 
monsoon dummies for average rainfall exceeding 20 for a month, a “missing 
                                                 
39 IMF (2009) 
40 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html There is also a service 
sector estimated to produce ca 25% of GDP. It is based around the intermediation of remittances from 
Somalis abroad and telecommunications with said community. Lindley (2009) and Seikh and Healy 
(2009) provide overviews of this sector, which may also provide finance for pirate activity. We are 
currently in the process of sourcing data on remittance flows. 
41 SWALIM Streamflow data are not yet available 
42 Beletweyne, Bulo Burti and Jowhar. Jowwjar data are missing from September to December 2004 
and have been estimated based on rainfall in the other stations. 
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rain” dummy if there is a shortfall of rain compared to the long run average by 
30mm and a “wet” dummy for months in which there was any rainfall.43 
8) Ramadan: Ramadan could have a positive effect on piracy if resources are 
needed to finance the festivities.44 We used the dates of Ramadan for daily 
analysis, for the monthly series we constructed one dummy if there were more 
than 10 Ramadan days in the month and a dummy if there were any Ramadan 
days in the month. A negative effect would be observed if illicit activity was 
shunned during the religious festival.45 
 
Costs 
The general hypothesis is that piracy thrives on lawlessness and disorder.46 It is 
doubtlessly true that pirates need safe havens outside the control of the government 
and hence with a low probability of security force interventions. However, piracy is 
also an economic activity that potentially suffers from disorder, as hostages need to be 
fed, kept in reasonable condition and under the pirates’ control for ransoming. 
Outbreaks of civil unrest can disrupt food supplies, but perhaps more importantly they 
would raise the cost of guarding prey from other groups who could extract ransoms.  
 
Throughout the period under investigation there has not been an effective central 
government in Somalia, though there have been variations in the degree of civil 
conflict. Unfortunately the data situation on violent conflict in Somalia mirrors that on 
economic activity. The PRIO dataset on civil war is extremely vague on the total 
number of fatalities in the civil conflict. For example the entries for 1993 and 1994 
have lower and upper bounds of 25 and 6000 respectively. There are no data at all 
between 1997-2001 and 2003-2005.47 Somalia clearly did not have sufficient security 
to allow foreign observers to operate effectively or at all. The only concrete 
information we have about civil conflict directly impacting on piracy is during the 
brief period during which the UIC replaced the transitional government in Mogadishu 
in 2006. The UIC took some drastic and highly visible measures against pirates. 
Perhaps more importantly they conquered the ports of Hobyo and Gharardeere in late 
2006 directly disrupting pirate activity. 
 
As for the business environment, Menkhaus (2003, 2007a) argues persuasively that 
absence of government does not necessarily mean absence of governance. After years 
of political instability, local governance has emerged based around clans, elders, 
businesspeople and mosques. In many areas these structures are strong enough for 
people to transact with confidence, as the experience of money transfer companies in 
Somalia shows.48 
 
In the absence of concrete information on governance we take an innovative approach 
to proxying for violent conflict and the ease of contracting. We use data collected by 
                                                 
43 We additionally used the International food price indices from the FAO for cereal, sugar and oil 
prices to proxy for import costs, but this was not significant in any of the regressions.  
44 Pirates appear to be able to get credit on the basis of a successful hijack. . See BBC (18/09/2008) Life 
in Somalia’s Pirate Town http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7623329.stm 
45 Attacks could, however, be increased if a high proportion of the target vessels are believed to be 
staffed with observant Muslims. 
46 Murphy (2007) 
47 Lacina and Gleditsch (2005). 
48 Lindley (2009) 
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the Somalia Water and Land Information management agency (SWALIM).49 
SWALIM is funded by development agencies, the EU and the United Nations and is 
rebuilding the data collection network for rainfall and river stream-flow data in 
Somalia following the civil war. The organisation has attempted to revive the 52 pre-
war weather stations. Data collection simply requires locating a measuring gauge in a 
particular way, reading daily data and sending a monthly report in the post.  
 
In the Somali context the well resourced SWALIM must be an exceptionally 
attractive employer. However, SWALIM has found it very difficult to reach many of 
the old stations and in several cases has had to site stations in alternative locations. 
Once a station is under contract, rainfall data are often patchy. Occasionally 
contracted stations simply do not submit a report to SWALIM, so that days or whole 
months are missing (diagram 3). Apparently this is generally linked to a worsening 
security situation – i.e. staff cannot leave their homes or have fled the area because of 
territorial disputes.50 Several stations were discontinued after reporting lapsed for a 
number of months, which explains the occasional drop in the number of stations 
contracted.  
 
We therefore use the following three rough proxies for local conditions in which 
(pirate) business is carried out. 
9) Contractual environment: We use the percentage of pre-war stations 
contracted as a proxy for the feasibility of entering into a long-term contract / 
supply relationship and building (very) basic infrastructure.  
10) Civil conflict: We use the number of stations not reporting as a (rough) proxy 
for the intensity of civil conflict.   
11) UIC dummy: We also use a dummy for the period of the UIC control in 
Mogadishu from June to December 2006.  
 
 
4: Results and Discussion 
 
4:1 Monthly observations: total incidents  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
The lagged dependent variable (i.e. the number of incidents in the preceding period) is 
highly significant and positive in all models. This provides support for the hypothesis 
that once groups acquire resources suitable for piracy, they will continue in the 
business. There is also some evidence that a success in the previous month increases 
pirate effort (small positive coefficient), but this is not always significant. There is, 
however, robust evidence that a success 4 months ago increases current piracy levels. 
This makes perfect sense given that it generally takes at least 2 months to negotiate a 
ransom and then presumably some time for the new boats / weapons to arrive. 
 
Improvements in the contracting environment also appear to benefit pirates (5% 
significance, small positive coefficient). This contradicts the assertion that pirates 
thrive on domestic chaos. Instead the suggested interpretation is that pirates need an 
                                                 
49 www.faoswalim.org/ 
50 Information reported by SWALIM 
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infrastructure of some sort to look after hostages, negotiate ransoms and get their own 
supplies. Similarly civil strife reduces piracy (significant negative coefficient). Again 
this contradicts the hypothesis that pirates benefit from disorder. Instead it could be 
argued that with a limited supply of weapons, warlords deploy their armed men either 
in piracy activities or in battles of resources on land. Alternatively in times of disorder 
more resources might be tied up in guarding the prey. 
 
These results are robust to the methodology used (OLS / Tobit), the definition of the 
dependent variable (total number or ln(1+total number)) and the inclusion of 
additional, insignificant variables. There is no statistically significant evidence for 
seasonal or weather patterns at the monthly level. Similarly we cannot find any 
statistically significant effects of any of the naval intervention variables at the 
aggregate level.  
 
 
4:2 Monthly observations: Incidents in the Gulf of Aden 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
The models estimated  for Aden underline the importance of resources in driving 
piracy: both the past level of piracy and past successes drive current piracy levels. 
Again the effect of successes 4 periods ago dominates the immediate effect, giving 
credence to Bossasso's police chief, Osman Hassan Uke’s statement: "Whenever 10 
guys get paid ransom money, 20 more pirates are created."51 The previous result that 
civil conflict disrupts piracy is also backed up, but the indicator for the contracting 
environment or the UIC dummy is not statistically significant in this model. This 
suggests that most of the problems in governance and civil violence are a 
phenomenon of Southern Somalia. Indeed the (unrecognised) “Republic of 
Somaliland” which declared its independence from Somalia in 1991 has enjoyed 
relative stability and was not affected by the 2006 conflict with the UIC. Coalition 
deterrence events are on the boarder of statistical significance (12%) – but with an 
unexpected positive coefficient. It suggests that if anything deterred pirates move on 
to the next prey, increasing the total number of attacks. We will revisit this issue in 
the analysis of daily data. 
 
 
4:3 Monthly observations: Incidents in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
In the Indian Ocean we again see persistence in pirate activity from one month to the 
next. However, in this area we do not have significant effects from past successes. 
The technological advance of using “motherships”, however, seems to have made 
piracy in this region more feasible. We also find some interesting effects from the 
naval intervention. The dummy for the presence of EU NAVFOR or (alternatively) 
the number of deterrence events are significant and reduce the number of attacks in 
the Indian Ocean ceteris paribus. However, it appears that the institution of the transit 
corridor has increased piracy in the open waters around Somalia and this effect 
                                                 
51 quoted in Postcard from Somali pirate capital http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8103585.stm  
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dominates the deterrence effect from the presence of naval forces. This looks like a 
classic substitution effect in which pirates (like criminals and terrorists) substitute 
“soft” targets for the protected prey.  
 
We also get a (less robust) result that rainy months see a decrease in piracy. Perhaps 
pirates have alternative employment in the agricultural sector or they shun the open 
seas during this time. The former interpretation is supported by the observation that a 
“missing rain” increases pirate activity. This result would also support the hypothesis 
that piracy is to some extent driven by poverty. Finally both increases in civil conflict 
(non-reporting stations, but in particular the UIC dummy) have a detrimental effect on 
pirate activity in this region.  
 
 
4:4 Monthly observations: Change in incidents from month to month 
 
Table 5 about here 
 
In the models looking at the change in piracy from one month to the next, the number 
of ships through Suez has a positive effect on piracy, but not the value or weight of 
cargo. This is consistent with reports of ransom payments which are well below the 
value of the cargo and ships. A success in the previous month reduces incidents in the 
current period. This may be a sign that pirates are guarding their prey rather than 
necessarily handing over to land-based teams. Four months after a successful hijack 
pirate activity again increases significantly. Again, the civil disorder proxy has a 
negative and significant coefficient and a severe “missing rain” increases the number 
of attacks in the month, providing support for the poverty hypothesis. There is no 
statistically significant effect of naval deterrence or rescue activities.  
 
 
Daily Observations 
 
Table 6 about here 
 
In all the short-term models we now observe clear effects of deterrence events. A 
deterred attack on the previous day lowers the probability of an attack today, but after 
two days the attack probability is higher again. Pirates seem to lie low or change 
position and then attack again. After an unsuccessful attempt another attack tends to 
follow the next day. After two days the probability is reduced in Aden suggesting that 
a significant proportion of the pirate boats only equipped for short outings. In the 
Indian Ocean the attack probability remains significantly higher for four days.   
 
Pirates are significantly less likely to attack on any given day during the Southwest 
and Northeast Monsoon seasons. When we split the sample into Somalia and Aden, 
both monsoon seasons matter in Aden, but for Somalia it is only the Southwest 
monsoon which matters (barely significant at the 10% level). As we do not observe 
this monsoonal pattern in the monthly figures, presumably pirates do attack on the 
more clement days within the monsoon season. With more precise wind-speed data 
we could probably get better explanatory power here. Ramadan and clear full moons 
increase the probability of attacks occurring.  
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A success on the previous day increases the probability of attack in Aden. This could 
either be an “encouragement effect” (if pirates communicate with each other) or 
reflect that successes tend to occur in particularly pirate-friendly conditions. Finally, 
there seem to be complementarities between the two locations – attacks in Aden are 
positive and significant in Somalia and vice versa: this may reflect common weather 
patterns or simply the rise of piracy in Somalia since 2007.  
 
 
5: Conclusions 
 
There are a number of clear messages from the data analysis above. Firstly, piracy 
appears to have increased over time as pirates demonstrated the potentially huge 
rewards from hijack and ransom. Profits appear to be (at least partially) re-invested 
and new people are attracted into the “business”. Given the apparent importance of 
successes / ransoms in fuelling piracy perhaps there is a policy implication about not 
negotiating ransoms or at least keeping them to a minimum.52  
 
Secondly, the way in which the naval forces operated until June 2009 did not deter 
pirates from operating in the region. Instead we find that when pirates are deflected 
from specific ships they simply lie low and attack another ship when the naval vessels 
have disappeared. Efforts to secure specific shipping lanes have not reduced the 
number of attacks in the Gulf of Aden, but have increased the number of incidents in 
the open seas. These areas are nearly impossible to patrol.  
 
Thirdly, we can link piracy to developments within Somalia. Pirates appear to benefit 
from political stability and improved governance, as long as the authority (which may 
be fairly local) is tolerant of pirate activity. Anecdotal evidence suggests that clan 
elders receive a significant proportion of the ransoms.53 This suggests that a land-
based approach to resolving the pirate problem would need to do more than establish 
a government in Mogadishu, as the regions have a serious incentive to resist central 
anti-piracy measures. Given the evidence for links between poverty and piracy, any 
intervention would also have to ensure that reasonably lucrative alternative 
occupations would need to be provided for former (and aspiring) pirates.  
 
Future work in this area will focus on improving the proxies for the naval efforts at 
deterring pirates in the long term through arrests and destruction / confiscation of 
equipment. In particular the question we would like to know whether being tried for 
piracy in a Western court might be an attraction in itself. Another fruitful research 
question would be to analyse the role of the Somali diaspora in financing pirate 
activity, and their role in the intermediation / safeguarding of profits arising from 
piracy. Finally, it may be possible to predict probability of attack occurring on a given 
day quite precisely with detailed wind-speed and weather data.  
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Diagram 1 
Incidents of Piracy off the Coast of Somalia and Aden
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Diagram 2 
Pirate successes and failures
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Diagram 3 
Weather Stations in Somalia
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Diagram 4 
Number and nationality of Naval forces present off Somalia in June 2009 
 
 
 
 
Source: EU NAVFOR 
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Table 1 
Variable Definitions and Sources 
Variable Name Source  Definition 
Incidents International Maritime Bureau  
Piracy reports 
Number of incidents 
reported in relevant 
region 
Success International Maritime Bureau  
Piracy reports 
Incidents which result 
in a successful 
hijacking and no 
subsequent rescue 
attempt is made 
Attempt International Maritime Bureau  
Piracy reports 
Incidents in which the 
crews successfully 
prevented boarding 
Rescue International Maritime Bureau  
Piracy reports 
Hijackings which were 
ended by security or 
naval force 
interventions 
Deterrence events International Maritime Bureau  
Piracy reports 
Incidents in which 
naval vessels 
successfully prevented 
boarding 
% pre-war stations 
contracted 
SWALIM Hydromet data 
inventory 
Number of stations 
under contract 
compared to pre-war 
total of 52 
Non-reporting stations SWALIM Regional rainfall 
reports 
Number of stations 
under contract which 
are not reporting 
UIC BBC news timeline of Somalia Dummy from June-
December 2006 
EU NAVFOR EU NAVFOR website Dummy from 
December 2008 
Transit Corridor http://www.mschoa.eu/ Dummy from January 
2009 
Motherships International Maritime Bureau  
Piracy reports 
Dummy from January 
2005 when 
motherships are first 
mentioned in the 
context of Somalia 
Rainy Months SWALIM Regional rainfall 
reports 
Months during which 
there is rainfall 
reported in the three 
stations for which data 
(mostly) exists from 
1997 
Missing rain SWALIM Regional rainfall 
reports 
Actual rainfall average 
compared to long term 
monthly average 
(1997-2008). Dummy 
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for months in which 
rainfall was lower than 
l-t average by more 
than 30mm.  
Clearfullmoon SWALIM rainfall reports Afgoi 5 days centred on full 
moon interacted with 
dummy of whether or 
not there was rain 
recorded at Afgoi 
weather station. 
Suezshipping http://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/ 
TRstat.aspx?reportId=1 
Number of vessels 
going through Suez in 
a give month 
Ramadan  Dates of Ramadan 
Northeast monsoon http://www.nrlmry.navy.mil/  
sat_training/world_wind_regimes 
/GulfOfAden/ 
fall_transition/index.html 
January-March 
Southwest monsoon  http://www.nrlmry.navy.mil/ 
sat_training/world_wind_regimes/ 
GulfOfAden/SW_Monsoon 
/index.html 
June-August. 
 
 
Table 2 
Monthly observations: total incidents  
The dependent variable is ln(1+ total number of incidents in Aden and Somalia)  
 
 Model 4:1 Model 4:2 
# of incidents 
in previous 
month 
0.384*** 
(0.101) 
0.537*** 
(0.150) 
Previous 
success 
0.082** 
(0.0332) 
0.066 
(0.053) 
Success 4 
periods ago 
0.134*** 
(0.042) 
0.137** 
(0.060) 
% pre-war 
stations 
contracted 
0.008 *** 
(0.008) 
0.009** 
(0.004) 
Non-reporting 
stations 
-0.064** 
(0.028) 
-0.071* 
(0.039) 
constant 0.380** 
(0.169) 
0.0255 
(0.227) 
Observations 90 90 
R-squared / 
pseudo R2 
0.6118 0.246 
Method OLS 
Robust SE 
Tobit 
* denotes significance at the 10% level. ** denotes significance at the 5% level. *** denotes 
significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 3 
Monthly observations: Incidents in the Gulf of Aden 
The dependent variable is ln(1+ total number of incidents in Aden)  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
# of incidents 
in previous 
month 
0.362*** 
(0.106) 
0.504*** 
(0.172) 
0.357*** 
(0.111) 
Previous 
period 
successes 
0.111*** 
(0.035) 
0.122** 
(0.059) 
0.073** 
(0.342) 
Successes 4 
periods ago 
0.171*** 
(0.038) 
0.240*** 
(0.072) 
0.128*** 
(0.039) 
Non-reporting 
stations 
-0.066*** 
(0.23) 
-0.130*** 
(0.048) 
 
Deterrence 
events 
  0.12 
(0.077) 
Transit 
Corridor 
  -0.318 
(0.319) 
constant 0.490*** 
(0.142) 
0.210  
(0.250) 
0.200*** 
(0.066) 
Observations 90 90  110 
R-squared / 
pseudo R2 
0.5772 0.2305 0.589 
Method OLS 
Robust SE 
Tobit OLS 
Robust SE 
* denotes significance at the 10% level. ** denotes significance at the 5% level. *** denotes 
significance at the 1% level. 
 
Table 4 
Monthly observations: Incidents in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea 
The dependent variable is ln(1+ total number of incidents in the Indian Ocean)  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
# of incidents 
in previous 
month 
0.388*** 
(0.078) 
0.515*** 
(0.149) 
0.381*** 
(0.078) 
Motherships 0.395*** 
(0.111) 
0.809*** 
(0.204) 
0.396*** 
(0.110) 
EU NAVFOR -0.752*** 
(0.137) 
 -0.652*** 
(0.132) 
Deterrence 
events (lagged) 
 -0.167**   
(0.084) 
 
Transit 
corridor 
1.461*** 
(0.390) 
1.490*** 
(0.555) 
1.389*** 
(0.418) 
Rainy month -0.190** 
(0.108) 
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UIC   -0.941*** 
(0.407) 
 
Missing rain   0.265*   
(0.164) 
constant 0.221*** 
(0.066) 
-0.347** 
(0.144) 
0.129** 
(0.062) 
Observations 113 113 113 
R-squared / 
pseudo R2 
0.4773 0.2194 0.4756 
Method OLS 
Robust SE 
Tobit OLS 
Robust SE 
* denotes significance at the 10% level. ** denotes significance at the 5% level. *** denotes 
significance at the 1% level. 
 
Table 5  
Monthly observations: Change in incidents from month to month 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
# ships through 
Suez 
0.004*   
(0.002) 
0.0034* 
(0.002) 
Previous 
period 
successes 
-0.858*** 
(0.267) 
-0.598 
0.389) 
Successes 4 
periods ago 
1.158*  
(0.598) 
1.306** 
(0.648) 
Non-reporting 
stations 
-0.343*   
(0.188) 
-0.341* 
(0.187) 
Missing rain 2.251*   
(1.200) 
2.169* 
(1.190) 
Rescue 
(lagged) 
 0.175 
(0.171) 
Deterrence 
(lagged) 
 -0.631 
(0.755) 
constant -4.186    
(2.788) 
-3.651 
(2.645) 
Observations 90 90 
R-squared / 
pseudo R2 
0.2438 0.2652 
Method OLS 
Robust SE 
OLS 
Robust SE  
* denotes significance at the 10% level. ** denotes significance at the 5% level. *** denotes 
significance at the 1% level. 
 
Table 6 
The dependent variable is whether or not an attack occurred in Models 1-3 and 
whether 0, 1 or more than 1 attacks occurred on a given day in Model 4  
 
 Model 1 
Total 
Model 2 
Aden 
Model 3 
Somalia 
Model 4  
Total 
Previous day’s 0.346   0.816** -1.081* 0.374*  
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success (in 
region) 
(0.246) (0.351) (0.642) (0.223) 
Previous day’s 
Deterrence 
-1.273*** 
(0.445) 
-0.794* 
(0.458) 
-1.035* 
(0.623) 
-1.084*** 
(0.411) 
Deterrence 2 
days ago 
0.710** 
(0.326) 
0.888** 
(0.451) 
0.870** 
(0.438) 
0.728** 
(0.300) 
Previous day’s 
attempt 
1.042***   
(0.190) 
0.911*** 
(0.222) 
1.834*** 
(0.464) 
0.847*** 
(0.153) 
Attempt 2 days 
ago 
 -0.369* 
(0.225) 
1.049***  
(0.421) 
 
Attempt 4 days 
ago 
  1.314*** 
(0.419) 
 
Attack in Aden   0.719** 
(0.339) 
 
Attack in 
Somalia  
 .751** 
(0.330) 
  
Northeast 
monsoon 
-0.769*** 
(0.290) 
-0.785*** 
(0.257) 
 -0.735** 
(0.232) 
Southwest 
monsoon  
-0.639***  
(0.247) 
-0.790*** 
(0.300) 
-0.984 
((0.625) 
-0.870*** 
(0.280) 
Ramadan 0.781*   
(0.408)  
   
Clear full 
moon 
0.489* 
(0.291) 
  0.492* 
(0.274) 
constant -0.105*** 
(0.179) 
-0.112*** 
(0.174) 
-3.026*** 
(0.267) 
 
Cut 1    0.968 
Cut 2    2.320 
Observations 545 545 545 545 
Pseudo R2 0.1209 0.0964 0.1499 0.0890 
Method Logit Logit Logit Ordered logit 
* denotes significance at the 10% level. ** denotes significance at the 5% level. *** denotes 
significance at the 1% level. 
